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BROKERAGE UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT:
TOWARD A NEW CERTAINTY
James F. Rill*
Prior to the Supreme Court's first Broch decision,' the application of the
"brokerage" provision of the Robinson-Patman Act2 could be determined by
the mere statement that the payment of a brokerage fee or an allowance reflect-
ing brokerage by a seller to a buyer or to the latter's agent was an absolute
violation.' In the five years that have elapsed since that decision, however, there
has been a great deal of confusion regarding both the object and the implemen-
tation of the "brokerage" provision. This confusion resulted from the Supreme
Court's concentration on the discriminatory4 advantage that a brokerage con-
cession had accorded a large buyer whose qualifications for preferential treat-
ment through services rendered or other c6nsiderations had not been demon-
strated.' In the Brock case the Court, in passing, expressed disapproval of the
implications which some observers had derived from traditional interpretations
that the "for services rendered" clause of the statute was a dead letter and that
discrimination was not an element of violation.6
It appears that extensive and intricate analysis of the Court's ruling, sub-
* Member, District of Columbia Bar; A.B., Dartmouth College, 1954; LL.B., Harvard Law
School, 1959; partner, Collier, Shannon & Rill, Washington, D.C.
1 FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960). Prior to the Broch decision, the
author of a complete work on the Robinson-Patman Act asserted:
The Section of the Robinson-Patman Act that has to do with the payment of
brokerage is the only one the meaning of which has been adequately tested by litiga-
tion. Eight of the orders of the Federal Trade Commission under this section were
appealed to the Courts. In the resulting decisions, judicial interpretation of this part
of the law became dear.
EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW 92 (1959). See AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION
106 (2d ed. 1959), where it is stated that "it is the only section as to which no important ques-
tion of interpretation remains to be settled." Compare the following post-Broch introduction to
the subsection by another eminent authority: "In the wake of the Supreme Court's 1960 Broch
decision new uncertainty swirls around previously settled applications of Section 2(c)'s vague
ban on 'brokerage' or Commission payments by one side to the other in a sales transaction."
Rows, PRscE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 330 (1962).
2 The "brokerage" subsection, § 2(c) of the Clayton Act, as added by the Robinson-
Patman Amendment, provides:It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a com-
mission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof,
except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or
merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction or to an agent, representa-
tive, or other intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in fact for or in
behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect control, of any party to such transaction
other than the person by whom such compensation is so granted or paid.
38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1964).
3 Although the subsection similarly proscribes payments by the buyer (or his agent) to the
seller (or his agent), the chief enforcement impact has been on payments or allowances directly
or indirectly made by the seller. This policy comports with the act's general concern with
abuses of buying power. Moreover, although a literal reading of the subsection would appear
to prohibit all forms of compensation passing between buyer and seller, it has been implemented
to reach only payments, allowances or discounts reflecting brokerage or commission services and
other similar services. See AUSTIN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 107.
4 363 U.S. 166, 175, 176 (1960).
5 Id. at 177, n.19.
6 Ibid. See, e.g., ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST RP. 188 (1955); AUSTIN, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 108-09.
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sequent decisions by the FTC and the courts and other administrative interpre-
tations .have now made it both timely and possible to undertake a new frame-
work for analysis of those practices which fall within the prohibitory scope of
2(c). However, any endeavor to reassess the bounds of the statute must com-
port with the legislative purpose underpinning 2(c) without doing unwarranted
violence to some of the early appellate court decisions interpreting it. In addi-
tion, the recent evaluations of the provision have indicated that future enforce-
ment must clearly establish a direct link between a payment or discount and
brokerage consideration and, if this is accomplished, must demonstrate that the
payment or discount represented a discriminatory "abuse" of the brokerage
function. It is submitted that clear, objective tests are available whereby these
preconditions to violation might be proven, and that 2(c) would then occupy
its appropriate and significant position in the Robinson-Patman fabric.
I. The Roots of Re-evaluation-The Supreme Court's View
of Legislative Purpose
Before considering the recent developments making possible a reorientation
of 2(c), we should assess the foundation of these interpretations and the legis-
lative history upon which the Broch decision expatiated. What should be
apparent-that section 2(c) is a corollary provision of an antidiscrimination
statute -must be emphasized at the outset. The Robinson-Patman Act was
itself in large measure an outgrowth of the FTC's Chain Store Investigation
and the concern therein expressed over the efforts of large buyers to exact dis-
criminatory concessions in many forms from their suppliers - and the frequency
with which this effort was successful." In expressing the general objectives of
the full measure, the House Committee stated:
The object of the bill briefly stated is to amend section 2 of the Clay-
ton Act so as to suppress more effectually discriminations between customers
of the same seller not supported by sound economic differences in their
business positions or in the cost of serving them. Such discriminations are
sometimes effected directly in prices, including terms of sale; and some-
times by separate allowances to favored customers for purported services
or other considerations which are unjustly discriminatory in their result
against other customers. The bill is accordingly drawn in six lettered sub-
sections, of which the first four, (a), (b), (c) [brokerage] and (d), contain
substantive measures directed at the more prevalent forms of discrimina-
tion."
The Committee explanations of the brokerage provision further focused on the
coercive power brought to bear by large buyers to obtain preferences, and again
the evil of discrimination was stressed:
7 FTC, Final Report on the Chain Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1935). The Commission evidenced substantial concern with the asserted practice of large
chains to exact brokerage concessions from suppliers especially through chain-owned brokerage
firms. FTC, supra at 24-28, 62, 63.
8 H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 '(1936). See S. RP. No. 1502, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1936).
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Among the prevalent modes of discrimination at which this bill is
directed is the practice of certain large buyers to demand the allowance
of brokerage direct to them upon their purchases, or its payment to an
employee, agent, or corporate subsidiary whom they set up in the guise of
a broker, and through whom they demand that sales to them be made.9
Broch was the first 2(c) matter heard by the Supreme Court, and its
lengthy and elaborate opinion indicates that the opportunity to set forth its
views on the foundations and purposes of the statute was not missed. The
case was brought by the Commission against a broker who had agreed with
his principal, the seller, to accept a reduced fee, permitting the reduction to
be passed on to a large buyer as a portion of a reduced price. The central issue
appears to have been whether the broker violated 2(c) by participating in such
an arrangement. The Court answered in the affirmative and concluded that
the practice effected the same economic result as though the broker had, by
agreement with the seller, paid part of his fee to the buyer." From this seemingly
narrow issue, the Court proceeded to consider the purpose of the subsection,
noting that the chief objective of the act was prohibition of all means whereby
large buyers could obtain discriminatory preferential treatment. The Court
observed:
One of the favorite means of obtaining an indirect price concession was
by setting up "dummy" brokers who were employed by the buyer and
who, in many cases, rendered no services. The large buyers demanded
that the seller pay "brokerage" to these fictitious brokers who then turned
it over to their employer. This practice was one of the chief targets of § 2(c)
of the Act. But it was not the only means by which the brokerage function
was abused and Congress in its wisdom phrased § 2(c) broadly, not only
to cover the other methods then in existence but all other methods by which
brokerage could be used to effect price discrimination."
The fact that discrimination is an element of a 2(c) offense is emphasized in
the full course of the opinion. This term or its concomitants "preference" and
"concession" appeared at no less than nine other places in the opinion all in
relation to the brokerage provision. In sum, the Court's perspective of the pro-
vision is in harmony with the legislative objectives which produced 2(c).
The Supreme Court did not, however, suggest that all discriminatory broker-
9 H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1936). The Senate Committee Report
more explicitly identified the type of practice with which Congress was concerned:
But to permit [a brokerage] payment or allowance where no such service is ren-
dered, where, in fact, if a "broker," so labeled, enters the picture at all, it is one
whom the buyer points out to the seller, rather than one who brings the buyer to the
seller, is but to permit the corruption of this function to the purposes of competitive
discrimination.
S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936).
10 It is noteworthy that the Broch case was not brought against the large buyer involved,
J. M. Smucker Co., especially in view of the Commission's expressed policy of centering enforce-
ment activities on such firms. See Max Factor & Co., 3 TRADE Rao. REP. f 16992 (F.T.C. July
22, 1964). The Court suggested that the buyer may not have known of the character of the
concessions granted and that this factor might be relevant in a proceeding against it. Scienter
may be, therefore, an element of a § 2(c) case. But see Thomasville Chair Co., 55 F.T.C. 2076
(1959); BAUM, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: SUMMARY AND COMMENT 43 (1964). Compare
Eidson Produce Co., 60 F.T.C. 1 (1962); Exchange Distrib. Co., 61 F.T.C. 1 (1962).
11 363 U.S. 166, 169 (1960).
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age payments or allowances would violate the act. Referring to the "for services
rendered" clause, the Court stated:
There is no evidence that the buyer rendered any services to the seller or
to respondent nor that anything in its method of dealing justified its getting
a discriminatory price by means of a reduced brokerage charge. We would
have quite a different case if there were such evidence and we need not
explore the applicability of § 2(c) to such circumstances.' 2
We need not view this administrative practice [the buying broker cases]
as laying down an absolute rule that § 2(c) is violated by the passing on
of savings in broker's commissions to direct buyers, for here, as we have
emphasized, the "savings" in brokerage were passed on to a single buyer
who was not shown in any way to have deserved favored treatment.'
3
The Court's analysis thus prepared the way for a rededication of section
2 (c) to the basic theme of the statute - prohibition of discriminatory practices
but only those which are sufficiently without justification to constitute an
"abuse" of the brokerage function.
The emphasis on unjustified discriminations as the central element of the
offense is not the only aspect of the case which has stimulated developments
further illuminating the test of illegality. In the opinion of some leading observers,
the FTC had for a number of years increasingly turned to the brokerage pro-
vision as the principal instrument for enforcement of the Robinson-Patman
Act. 4 A series of early appellate court decisions had held that the defenses of
cost justification and meeting competition cognizable in a section 2(a) proceed-
ing were not available to a party charged with violating 2(c)."s The courts
held that it was unnecessary for the Commission to prove capacity for competi-
tive injury. 6 In Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC' the court held that a dis-
crimination need not be established. The Commission has been accused of
maximizing its use of the subsidiary per se provision and paradoxically dealing
with overt price discriminations as though they were concealed brokerage con-
cessions.' 8 Implicitly disapproving this practice, the Supreme Court stressed
12 Id. at 173.
13 Id. at 177, n.19.
14 See RowE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 538-40.
15 It is an absolute defense to a § 2(a) complaint that the discrimination involved makes
. . only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting
from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold
or delivered. . . ." 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964). It is also an absolute
defense that the lower price was ". . . made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a com-
petitor." 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1964). There are cases holding these
defenses inapplicable to § 2(c) cases. FTC v. Washington Fish & Oyster Co., 271 F.2d 39 (9th
Cir. 1959) (meeting competition); Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.
1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940) (cost defense). See FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co.,
360 U.S. 55, 67 (1959) (dictum as to availability of defenses in § 2(c) matters).
16 Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939).
17 Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
772 (1946). The Supreme Court cited Southgate in the Broch opinion but only for the proposi-
tion that a price reduction may constitute an allowance in lieu of brokerage. 363 U.S. 166, 173
(1960). See FTC v. Washington Fish & Oyster Co., 271 F.2d 39, 44 (9th Cir. 1959).
18 For example, see Commissioner Elman's dissenting opinion in Central Retailer-Owned
Grocers, Inc.:
It seems to me that the Commission's decision stretches Section 2(c) . . . far
beyond the limits of its language and manifest purpose, to a point where it now
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the need directly to relate a 2(c) charge to the brokerage function with the
following admonition:
This is not to say that every reduction in price, coupled with a reduction
in brokerage, automatically compels the conclusion that an allowance "in
lieu" of brokerage has been granted. As the Commission itself has made
clear, whether such a reduction is tantamount to a discriminatory payment
of brokerage depends on the circumstances of each case.19
The broad Broch guidelines have been implemented to a substantial degree
so that 2(c) may emerge from its immediate post-Broch uncertainties. These
developments bear both on the identification of a brokerage payment or allow-
ance and on the criterion of unjustified discrimination.
II. Identification of Brokerage Payments or Allowances
Traditionally, in those instances where existence of a brokerage payment
or allowance has not been conceded, the Commission has tended to attack
under 2(c) virtually any price paid by a direct purchaser which was lower than
the price at which similar merchandise was being sold to other purchasers
through brokers." Early support for this policy might be inferred from the
A & P case, 2' wherein, as a result of enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act,
respondent abolished its controlled brokerage concern and instructed its buyers
to seek concessions, equal to the amount of the brokerage theretofore paid, in
the guise of quantity discounts. The administrative practice was rapidly extended
to reach much less imposing firms.22
Several decisions antedating the Broch opinion, however, cautioned against
the reckless selection of 2(c) as a felicitous vehicle for attacking all discrimina-
tions under the act. In Main Fish Co.2" the Commission refused to condemn
such price differentials under the brokerage provision in the absence of specific
proof of their relationship to the customary brokerage fee. A perishable product
and a market characterized by frequent price fluctuations were involved. The
complaint was dismissed because of the absence of mathematical equivalence
between price difference and normal brokerage and doubt as to similarity of
product bought by each class of customers. Thus,-it appears that erratic price
concessions in a volatile market would normally be beyond the reach of the
brokerage provision. Irregular grants of such concessions point to a competitive
market characterized by changing price levels, whereas the adjudicative ex-
perience with allowances "in lieu" of brokerage has been largely with discounts
threatens to swallow up much of the territory covered by the more general statutory
provisions which it was intended to supplement.
60 F.T.C. 1208, 1241-42 "(1962) (dissenting opinion), rev'd, 319 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963).
19 363 U.S. 166, 175-76 (1960).
20 The question of identifying a particular allowance or discount as "brokerage" inevitably
arises under the "in lieu of" phase of the subsection, not in connection with sales fees to
"brokers" which resell for their own account.
21 Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3rd Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308
U.S. 625 (1940).
22 See, e.g., Union Malleable Mfg. Co., 52 F.T.C. 403 (1952); Ramsdell Packing Co.,
32 F.T.C. 1187 (1941).
23 Main Fish Co., 53 F.T.C. 88 (1956).
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to direct buyers consistently reflecting the amount of normal brokerage. The
Commission implicitly recognized that erratic prices are the lawful characteristic
of perishable markets in evaluating such conditions under 2(a) in its Trade
Practice Rules for the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Industry.24 Under such cir-
cumstances, the advantage, if any, is neither hidden nor concealed but appears
on the face of the invoice and, if competitive consequences warrant, can be dealt
with under section 2(a). This does not suggest that only those allowances or
discounts which are equal to customary brokerage are within the ambit of 2 (c),
since the Broch case itself represented an instance where the reduced price re-
flected both a portion of the broker's fee and other concessions by the seller.
Moreover, in Thomasville Chair Co.25 the Commission was probably correct
in assigning a portion of a price differential to volume buyers to savings in fees
paid commission salesmen.2"
Even where such mathematical equivalence was present, the Ninth Circuit
refused to conclude that an interpacker discount constituted a brokerage allow-
ance, although it was labeled "brokerage" by the parties to the transaction.
According to the court:
None of the documents refers to the 5% discount to Wendt as an "inter-
packer" discount. On the contrary, it was three times noted as "brokerage."
But even if the documents had referred to the allowance as an interpacker
discount, this would not have been conclusive as to its true character....
If it serves the same purpose, has the same effect, and enjoys no economic
justification which entitled it to be distinguished, a so-called interpacker
24 Example No. 3 in § 74.1(c) of the Trade Practice Rules for the Fresh Fruit and
Vegetable Industry, 30 Fed. Reg. 5332 (1965), illustrates a practice which does not violate §
2(a) as follows:
Example No. 3. A large number of sellers and buyers are continuously engaged
in bargaining for what is, from their standpoint, the best possible price for a particular
commodity. Numerous transactions take place with great rapidity, usually consum-
mated through telephone conversations. On occasion, one buyer may purchase from
a seller goods at a lower price than another buyer may purchase goods of like grade
and quality from the same seller. On a subsequent day or within a series of subse-
quent transactions on the same day, the situation is reversed. While on any given day
discriminations are likely to exist, there is not likely to be a violation of paragraph (a)
of this section if:
1. The discriminations are not the result of a plan or formula whereby a par-
ticular buyer or class of buyers receives a relatively consistent advantage, and
2. The discriminations do not, in fact, afford a relatively consistent advantage
to a particular buyer or class of buyers, and
3. The discriminations are not of such size or extent as to be likely to cause or
threaten injury to buyers or classes of buyers which purchase from the same seller
but do not receive any benefit from the discriminations, and
4. The discriminations are not of such a nature as to cause or threaten com-
petitive injury to competing sellers.
25 Thomasville Chair Co., 58 F.T.C. 441 (1961), rev'd, 306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962),
dismissed, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 16624 (F.T.C. Oct. 22, 1963).
26 Thomasville Chair should nevertheless have been initiated under § 2 (a). A volume dis-
count was involved which was, according to the Commission, in part attributable to savings in
commission expense. Whether such savings are cognizable under the § 2'(a) cost justification
defense has been considered and answered in the negative by the Commission. Borden Co., 3
TRADE REG. REP. 1 16191 (F.T.C. Nov. 28, 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 339 F.2d 133 (5th
Cir. 1964). For a brief discussion of the interrelationships between this issue and the "for
services rendered" clause of § 2(c), see Note, Unfair Trade Practices- Robinson-Patman Act
- Savings Realized on Salesmen's Commissions Cognizable Under Section 2(c), 30 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 137 (1961).
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discount ought to be regarded as an allowance in lieu of commission or
brokerage-but not otherwise.
2 7
According to the First Circuit, termination of all brokerage services, conversion
to direct sales and reduction in price to customers by the amount of former
brokerage will not suffice to establish a seller's violation of 2(c). Its decision
in Robinson v. Stanley Home Prods. Co.28 appeared to turn primarily on the
intent of the party charged. The court stated: "while a reduction in price to
the buyer could fall within this definition, obviously not every one would do so.
The question must be, what was the purpose of, or the reason for, the reduction."29
Since the Broch case, additional interpretations have further narrowed the
type of discounts or allowances which might be considered "in lieu" of broker-
age. The Commission's Hruby decision firmly established FTC acceptance of
the Ninth Circuit's statement that terminology will not supersede fact."0 In
the Hruby case, it was held that what was essentially a functional discount to
an intermediary occupying the same position as a broker in the distributive
channel would not be considered a brokerage allowance although so styled by
respondents:
The occasional characterization of these allowances to Hruby as
"brokerage", or their listing by a producer in a Section 6 questionnaire
under "discounts in lieu of brokerage", reveals nothing more than the not
surprising fact that businessmen, in describing their actions, do not talk
like lawyers expert in the niceties of the Robinson-Patman Act. 1
The effect of the Hruby decision in connection with the identification of broker-
age allowances is, therefore, to re-emphasize the virtual irrelevance of nomen-
clature - if a concession is in fact attributable to functional or other considera-
tions, it should not fall victim to the broad enforcement trap of 2 (c).
In the Central Retailer-Owned Grocers case,82 the Seventh Circuit had
occasion to evaluate a discount labeled a promotional allowance on the basis
of which a 2(c) order had been imposed against a purchasing organization for
a number of independent retail grocers. Reversing the Commission, the court
impugned the validity of the mathematical equivalence test, which it considered
the sole basis for the order, and commented:
The substantial evidence in the record, considered as a whole, lends
no support to the inference drawn by the Commission to the effect that
27 In r- Whitney & Co., 273 F.2d 211, 215 (9th Cir. 1959). Conversely, as indicated by
the court, the fact that a brokerage concession is designated by some other title does not con-
clude its true character. See Carpel Frosted Foods, Inc., 48 F.T.C. 581 (1951).
28 272 F.2d 601 '(1st Cir. 1959). This case was cited with approval by the Supreme Court
in the Broch case, 363 U.S. 166, 176, n.18 (1960).
29 Id. at 603. The Commission's opinion in Venus Foods, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 1025
(1960), presents an interesting conflict. There a seller who ceased doing business through
brokers in one section of the country and reduced prices by the amount of the usual broker-
age in that area was found to have violated § 2(c). Consideration of whether or not the
arrangement was discriminatory would doubtless have produced a different result.
30 Hruby Distrib. Co., 61 F.T.C. 1437 (1962).
31 Id. at 1449. The ramifications of the Hruby decision on the incorporation of discrimina-
tion as a precondition to violation is analyzed in text accompanying notes 44-46 infra.
32 Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, 319 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963).
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Central received or accepted price concessions "in lieu of brokerage". It
is obvious that, without any facts to support this inference, counsel for the
Commission made a mathematical comparison between brokerage, if it had
been paid by suppliers on sales through brokers, and the savings accom-
plished by Central for its members, in its direct dealings with the suppliers.
• . . [W]e doubt whether this synthetic method of proving a violation of
§ 2(c) is warranted, in the face of abundant, concrete evidence in the
record showing that this proceeding is directed against an inherently legiti-
mate enterprise.
33
The court concluded that the allowances to Central were based not on brokerage
but on assured volume, assumption of credit risks, reduction in billings and
commitments on future sales.
The Commission, in its memorandum dismissing the Thomasville Chair
case, implicitly recognized the specificity with which the link between brokerage
and a discount must be established when it stated:
We read the Court of Appeals' decision as holding that the Commission,
in a case in which it is alleged that a seller has violated Section 2(c) of
the Clayton Act by passing on a reduction in brokerage to favored buyers
in the form of a discriminatory price reduction, may not rely solely on
the fact that the seller has paid less brokerage on the sales at the lower
price, but must establish a causal relationship between the reduced broker-
age and the reduced price.
3 4
The Commission added that it did not necessarily agree with much of the
court's dicta.
The most recent Commission ruling on this issue occurred in Flotill Prods.,
Inc., 5 where a majority of two found that a canner of fruits and vegetables
had violated 2(c) by making payments designated "promotional allowances"
to a large customer. Chairman Dixon, writing for the Commission, after de-
termining that there was no coincidence in time between the termination of
sales to the customer through brokers and the inception of the allowance, searched
for other factors indicative of a brokerage allowance. The decisive factors were
found to be: (1) mathematical equivalence; (2) testimony of a former employee
of the customer that brokerage savings were discussed in negotiating the pay-
ment; (3) the "promotional allowances" were attributable to private label mer-
chandise supplied by others as well as respondent; and (4) the payments deviated
from Flotill's normal promotional allowance procedures both in amount and in
its failure regarding this customer to call for a regular accounting of advertising
services rendered.
If supported by substantial evidence, some of these elements of proof may
be useful, together with the authorities already discussed, for the identification
of allowances in lieu of brokerage. It is submitted that the following considera-
tions are appropriate:
33 Id. at 415.
34 Thomasville Chair Co., 3 TRAn REG. REP. 16624 (F.T.C. Oct. 22, 1963) memoran-
dum accompanying dismissal order).
35 Flotill Prods., Inc. 3 TRADE REG. REP. 16970 (F.T.C. June 26, 1964). A petition for
review is currently pending in the Ninth Circuit. No. 19521.
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1) Sales made by a seller to direct buying customers at prices lower, by
approximately the amount of the customary brokerage fee, than that
paid by customers in the same market area who buy through the brokers,"8
would establish an inference that an allowance or discount in lieu of
brokerage had been granted. 7
2) This inference could be overcome by evidence that the allowances
or discount were in fact based on other considerations, such as:
a) volume discounts, an assertion which could be corroborated by
proof that the customer received preferential treatment even on occa-
sions when he purchased through a broker, either from the same seller
or another seller; 8
b) cost savings other than savings in brokerage; 9
c) promotional allowances or services, supported by proof that the
purchaser in fact rendered valuable advertising or other promotional
services to the supplier; and
d) other considerations, such as the purchaser's prompt payment,
willingness to accept lower quality merchandise or reasonable rejec-
tion policy.
In connection with the suggested types of defensive evidence which would
overcome a brokerage inference, it may be suggested that other subsections of
the act might come into play. Nevertheless, section 2(c) is under discussion.
The same unique accounting methodology and precision would not be required
to overcome a 2(c) charge as to establish a 2(a) cost defense, and the same
showing of availability of advertising and promotional allowances on propor-
tionally equal terms as required under 2(d)4" need not be made. As has been
stated, "Section 2(c) is narrowly drawn to condemn the practice of exchanging
brokerage between buyer and seller, whether the exchange be by an open pay-
ment or disguised as a discount or allowance."'"
36 This standard derives from the conclusion that discrimination is essential to a 2(c) viola-
tion. See text accompanying notes 44-57 infra.
37 Of course, if there is credible and reliable testimony that an allowance or payment was
founded on brokerage considerations, the extrinsic proof necessary to establish a prima facie case
will not be so comprehensive.
38 This is a logical corollary of the statement in the Trade Practice Rules § 74.2 (e) that:
(e) A discount or allowance by an industry member is in lieu of brokerage if it
is attributable to a reduction or elimination of brokerage fees in connection with the
sales transaction involved.
(1) A discount or allowance granted by an industry member to some but not all
customers would not under ordinary circumstances be considered in lieu of broker-
age if -
(i) The industry member granting same makes no sales through brokers to any
of his customers, or
(ii) The industry member makes all of his sales through brokers to any of his
customers at the same brokerage rate.
(2) The actual basis for a discount or allowance at the time it was granted will
indicate whether or not such was in lieu of brokerage.
30 Fed. Reg. 5333 (1965).
39 Thomasville Chair Co., 55 F.T.C. 2076 (1959).
40 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13'(d) (1964).
41 Western Fruit Growers Sales Co. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 67, 69 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 907 (1964).
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The selection of these standards would involve rejection of at least one
other possible test which has been suggested. In the Stanley Home Prods.
case,4" the First Circuit centered its attention upon the purpose and design of
the discount involved and suggested that the intent of the parties to the trans-
action would be controlling as to the character of the consideration. Such a
criterion, while supportable in theory, would be administratively unworkable and
could result in evisceration of the subsection. Moreover, as the Commission has
stated, "intent" is irrelevant to a violation of 2(c). " Under this proposed test,
both "mathematical equivalence" and nomenclature standing alone would
be accorded little or no weight.
III. Section 2(c) and Discrimination
The post-Brach enforcement policy adopted by the Commission plainly
indicates that it has acceded to and implemented the Supreme Court's conclu-
sion that there is an essential nexus between discriminatory preferential treat-
ment and illegal "brokerage." In the landmark Hruby", decision, the Com-
mission evaluated respondent's operations against those which the act was
designed to prevent:
Hruby is clearly not a "dummy" broker controlled by a large buyer to
whom he passes on phony brokerage payments. Equally clearly, he is not
himself a powerful wholesaler or retail chain exacting from his suppliers
false brokerage payments, to the competitive disadvantage of his smaller
competitors. And, finally, it is clear that the discounts received by Hruby
are not granted because on sales to him sellers could dispense with broker-
age services regularly required on their sales, thus effecting savings of usual
brokerage fees.45 (Emphasis added.)
The Commission found that the discounts to Hruby, though labeled "brokerage,"
were in fact functional discounts to a distributor operating at the same level
of distribution as that occupied by a broker in negotiating purchases from ship-
ping point for redistribution to wholesale accounts, and hence were neither
brokerage fees nor discriminatory.
In a letter interpreting the Hruby decision shortly after its issuance, Chair-
man Dixon wrote:
The crucial question in every Section 2(c) case, brought against either
the buyer or the seller, is whether the alleged competitive advantage accorded
or received by the buyer actually involves preferential treatment in the
form of a direct price discrimination cognizable under Section 2(a). And
in every such case, the answer to this question must be determined by an
examination of all the facts, including the normal business operations of
the buyer and seller, the relationships of these parties to each other and
to their customers and suppliers, and the circumstances, it appears that the
situation involves the use of one or more of the devices at which Section
42 Robinson v. Stanley Home Prods., Inc., 272 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1959).
43 Thomasville Chair Co., 55 F.T.C. 2076 (1959). But see note 10 supra.
44 Hruby Distrib. Co., 61 F.T.C. 1437 (1962).
45 Id. at 1447-48.
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2(c) was aimed, i.e., "dummy" brokerage setups, in which purchases are
made through fictitious brokers to whom brokerage is paid by the sellers;
"falsie" brokerage payments to some but not all of a seller's competing
customers; price discounts based on direct sales allegedly resulting in savings
to sellers of brokerage fees customarily paid to brokers whose services are
dispensed with; or some variation of these devices, the case is one for
disposition under Section 2(c), with the well-settled interpretations ap-
plicable. If, on the other hand, none of these indicia is present and an
analysis of the circumstances precludes as a logical conclusion the con-
cept or hypothesis of brokerage, or allowances in lieu of brokerage, then
the case is one for treatment under Section 2(a), involving the additional
burdens of proof and questions of justification and defense for which the
statute provides .... 46
In its most recent 2(c) adjudication, the Commission affirmed the examiner's
findings and order against respondent, because:
Here, as in F.T.C. v. Henry Broch & Company, 363 U.S. 166, 173 (1960),
"there is no evidence that the buyer rendered any services to the seller[s]
... nor that anything in its method of dealing justified its getting a dis-
criminatory price" as "brokerage" or discounts in lieu thereof. On the
basis of the findings of fact, the examiner was correct in concluding that
the payments received by respondent violated Section 2(c) of the Clayton
Act, as amended.
4 7
It thus appears that the Commission will consider violative of 2(c) only
those "brokerage" concessions which effect a discrimination. This additional
incubus of proof imposed on FTC counsel should be analyzed. Before the
present line of administrative interpretation, it was widely thought that intro-
duction of invoices or similar documentary evidence denoting a reduction for
"brokerage" or other distributive services, together with proof that the recipient
was in fact buying for his own account, would suffice to establish a violation."8
Now it appears that there must be proof that competitors of the firm alleged
to have benefitted from discriminatory brokerage payments or allowances were
in fact paying the suppliers a higher net price for similar merchandise.
Two categories of such proof are involved: (1) evidence of actual trans-
actions at higher prices between the seller involved and other customers at or
about the time of the asserted discrimination;4" and (2) evidence that the dis-
46 Letter From Chairman Paul Rand Dixon to Mr. Watson Rogers, Feb. 13, 1963, in
5 TRADE REG. REP. 50180, at 55191.
47 Garrett-Holmes & Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 17209 (F.T.C. Feb. 26, 1965) (final order).
Commissioner MacIntyre concurred in the result, but asserted that "the Majority, in holding
that the brokerage payments were discriminatory prices unjustified by services rendered to the
seller, applies a Section 2 (a) test where it does not belong and misinterprets through misapplica-
tion here the Supreme Court's Broch decision .... " Garrett-Holmes & Co., supra at 22280
(concurring opinion).
48 See Custom House Packing Corp., 43 F.T.C. 164 (1946); W. E. Robinson & Co., 32
F.T.C. 370 (1941); Albert W. Sisk & Son, 31 F.T.C. 1543 (1940); C. F. Unruh Brokerage
Co., 31 F.T.C. 1557 (1940); C. G. Reaburn & Co., 31 F.T.C. 1565 (1940); William Silver
& Co., 31 F.T.C. 1589 '(1940); H. M. Ruff & Son, 31 F.T.C. 1573 (1940); Thomas Roberts &
Co., 31 F.T.C. 1551 (1940); American Brokerage Co., 31 F.T.C. 1581 (1940).
49 The examiner's comment in Garrett-Holmes - that other customers might have pur-
chased from the suppliers involved, but for the preferences accorded to respondent - appears
to be wholly inappropriate under any concept of discrimination, and especially in view of the §
2(a) proviso that nothing in the act shall prevent customer selection not in restraint of trade.
Garrett-Holmes & Co., 3 TRADE REo. REP. 1 17081 (F.T.C. Sept. 29, 1964) (initial order).
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advantaged purchasers were in fact in competition with the recipient of "broker-
age." The ruling in FTC v. Anheuser-Busch4' to the effect that a discrimina-
tion means only a price difference and need not involve different purchasers in
the same market, arose in a 2(a) primary line case (injury to competitors of
the discriminating seller). In secondary line issues (discrimination among
competing customers), there should be a showing of entitlement to equal treat-
ment.51
It should not be burdensome for Commission counsel to assemble the docu-
mentary evidence showing that the beneficiary of brokerage concessions in fact
purchased at lower prices than other companies in the same market, and indeed
such proof might be called for to make a threshold showing that brokerage
was involved at all.52 In any event, proof of specific transactional discriminations
has been called for by the Commission to support an allegation that promotional
allowances are not made available on proportionally equal terms to competing
customers. The general statements of witnesses are inadequate. As the Com-
mission has perceptively appreciated:
Antitrust cases, and in particular, Robinson-Patman cases require a meticu-
lous attention to minute details. When dealing with prices, allowances and
goods of like grade and quality, the Commission may not indulge in assump-
tions, for those matters are susceptible of exact proof and this is the type
of showing which must be made.5"
The question of whether or not disadvantaged enterprises are "in competition"
with the preferred customer raises more complex issues. At the very least, of
course, it should be established that the favored and disfavored customers are
located in the same geographic market. But, in addition, must they operate at
the same functional level in seeking to convey merchandise to the same trade
for there to be a discrimination? Such an interpretation of 2(d) has been sug-
gested by the Ninth Circuit,54 although the Commission has taken a different
view in its collateral enforcement of section 5.55 The independent character of
2 (c) militates in favor of a broader interpretation which would cover all broker-
age concessions which effect a price discrimination among purchasers effectively
competing in the redistribution of the seller's merchandise. Thus, the provisions
would reach preferential brokerage treatment accorded a large wholesaler but
not to other customers, whether wholesalers or retailers, in the same market.
One other element of proving discrimination deserves attention. The goods
involved must be of like grade and quality. In an earlier case involving circum-
stantial evidence of brokerage concessions, the Commission appeared to accord
50 363 U.S. 536 (1960).
51 As stated during debate by Congressman Utterback, the House floor manager, "Under-
lying the meaning of the word [discrimination] is the idea that some relationship exists between
the parties to the discrimination which entitles them to equal treatment, whereby the difference
granted to one casts some burden or disadvantage on the other." 80 CONG. REc. 9416 (1936).
It is, of course, not inconceivable that hidden brokerage concessions could be employed to lessen
competition or create monopoly in the primary line. In this event, the Anheuser-Busch rationale
should apply in a § 2(c) proceeding.
52 See discussion in text accompanying notes 21-42 supra.
53 J. Weingarten, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 16349 (F.T.C. March 25, 1963).
54 Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694, 709-10 (9th Cir. 1964).
55 Fred Meyer, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. % 16368 (F.T.C. March 29, 1963).
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with this view.56 Nevertheless, the lately intensified controversy surrounding the
meaning of the term57 is relevant to the issue here, especially since 2(c) enforce-
ment has been substantially concerned with trading in perishable commodities,
as to which slight variations in size and grade can result in marked price dif-
ferences.
IV. Section 2(c) and Discriminatory "Abuses" of the Brokerage Function
In line with the suggestion in the Broch case, not all discriminatory broker-
age payments or allowances will violate 2(c). The Supreme Court in the Broch
case spoke not only in terms of discrimination but also of "abuses" of the broker-
age function,58 the fact that it would be a different matter had services been
rendered,59 and the possibility that some purchasers might qualify even for
discriminatory brokerage concessions."0 Simultaneously, the Court stressed that
it should not be interpreted as fusing the provisions of 2(c) with those of 2(a)
and that the 2(a) cost defense would not be available to a party charged with
violating the brokerage provisions. The Commission, in the Garrett-Holmes
case,6 quoted Brocth both as to discrimination and to support its finding that
respondent had not rendered services justifying preferential treatment.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's express statement that 2(c) was not
to be linked with 2(a) in all respects, the Fifth Circuit very closely approximated
attaching the cost defense to 2(c). Relying on Broch for its authority, the court
stated:
However, as we read it, the Court's opinion says that a reduction in price,
giving effect to reduced commissions paid by the seller, are violations of
Section 2(c) only if such reduction in price is "discriminatory." We read
that to mean "without justification based on actual bona fide differences
in the costs of sales resulting from the differing methods or quantities in
which such commodities are sold or delivered." 62
This holding appears inconsistent with, rather than interpretive of, the Supreme
Court's ruling. Moreover, it may be inappropriate to breathe new life into the
"for services rendered" clause through administrative interpretation rather than
remedial legislation. A new interpretation may be desirable but the provision's
inapplicability to brokerage services rendered the seller by the buyer seems too
entrenched to be so conveniently dislodged. 3
It is submitted that there is an alternative test available for arrangements
constituting an abuse of the brokerage function. Once again, recourse to those
56 Main Fish Co., 53 F.T.C. 88 (1956).
57 Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 382 U.S. 807 (1965).
58 363 U.S. 166, 169 (1960).
59 Id. at 173.
60 Id. at 177, n.19.
61 Garrett-Holmes & Co., 3 TRADE REO. REP. 1 17209 (F.T.C. Feb. 26, 1965).
62 Thomasville Chair Co. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 541, 545 (5th Cir. 1962).
63 Webb-Crawford Co. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 638
(1940). See also cases cited supra notes 15, 16 & 17. See ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTI-
TRUST REP. 192, 193 (1955).
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practices at which the act was aimed points the way. According to Commissioner
Elman:
The first was the practice of using "dummy" brokers. A buyer would
designate one of his employees as a broker and insist that the seller pay
this "broker" a specified "brokerage" fee. The "broker" then would remit
the fee to his employer without having performed any brokerage services.
The second practice with which Congress was concerned was closely
related. A large buyer, rather than set up a "dummy" broker and require
payment of brokerage to him, might simply demand a discount or allow-
ance respecting or "in lieu of" brokerage. Like the first practice, this was
a method for extorting a brokerage fee or commission from the seller, not
on account of brokerage services actually rendered, but as an indirect
form of price discrimination. Congress sought, in Section 2 (c), to deal with
the first practice by forbidding brokerage payments to a party on the other
side of the transaction where no brokerage services were rendered, and
with the second by forbidding "any allowance or discount in lieu" of
brokerage where such discount or allowance was not justified by any services
rendered.
The third type of transaction is that involved in the Broch case. There
a broker was actually used in a transaction in which a discriminatory price
concession was granted by seller to buyer; and the broker, by accepting a
reduction in the brokerage due him on the sale from the seller, helped
defray the concession. The vice in such an arrangement is that if a seller
is free in this manner to shift the burden of a discriminatory concession
to another person, the broker, he obviously has less incentive to resist a
powerful buyer's demand for preferential price treatment. If, on the other
hand, the seller is absolutely forbidden to recoup such a discount or allow-
ance from his broker, he is likely to put up more resistance in the impor-
tunings of large buyers seeking discriminatory price concessions. Section
2(c) closes the easy and inviting route to price discrimination which would
be wide open if the seller could shift the cost of discrimination to a third
person, the broker.6 4
Although this exposition was in a separate opinion, there is a clear parallel
between this analysis and the standards described in Chairman Dixon's letter
commenting on the Hruby case.65 Commissioner Elman concluded:
Thus, Section 2(c) has only a limited though important role to play
in the enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act. It is not a general regu-
lation of brokers or other intermediaries, or of methods of distribution. It
was not intended to freeze the brokerage function at what it may have
been in 1936, or to tell brokers whether they may buy and resell on their
own account, or to prevent buyers from performing brokerage functions,
or otherwise discouraging changes or innovations in traditional forms of
distribution. It is not concerned with legitimate, bona fide transactions at
all, but strictly with phony, unearned brokerage. The common characteris-
tic of all transactions prohibited by 2(c) is that brokerage or other legiti-
mate and valuable services in distribution are not performed.
66
64 Flotill Prods., Inc., 3 TRADE REO. REP. 1 16970, at 22045-47 (F.T.C. June 26, 1964)
(Comm'r Elman, concurring opinion).
65 Letter From Chairman Paul Rand Dixon to Mr. Watson Rogers, Feb. 13, 1963, in
5 TRADE REG. REP. 50180, at 55191.
66 Flotill Prods., Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. Y 16970, at 22046 (F.T.C., June 26, 1964).
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A possible means of relegating 2(c) to its legitimate role without arbi-
trarily freezing the brokerage function and discouraging new methods of distri-
bution may be suggested by once again borrowing from the central subsection's
concept of discrimination. Under 2(a), a price difference will not be considered
illegal if the disfavored customer could reasonably have qualified to purchase
at the most advantageous price offered. As the Ninth Circuit has recently con-
cluded:
The probability of competitive detriment on the buyer level presup-
poses a causal link between the seller's prices and the impact on customers
competition.... To be more specific, if the lower price would have been
available to the nonfavored buyer in the same market where the favored
buyer made his purchase, the probability of competitive injury due to the
fact that the nonfavored buyer paid more for the product is not the result
of price discrimination, but of the nonfavored buyer's failure to take
advantage of the opportunity equally available to him, of'buying at the
same low price.1
7
Although the question of availability would have a limited application to a 2(c)
proceeding, it would at least give latitude to developing methods of distribution
provided by intermediary firms which serve a brokerage function and offer other
services as well. There is no reason why brokerage consideration cannot be
given a firm which operates at the same level and performs the same function
as a broker in addition to taking title, arranging for transportation, assuming
credit risks and storing and redistributing merchandise in small lots to ware-
house receivers. The act does not compel such an economically stultifying result.
The solution need not rest on the ground that the consideration is a functional
discount because the commission rationale of functions is incomplete, providing
less than realistic cognizance of actual functions performed."8
Under the proposed test, a shipper could announce a policy that discounts
would be available either for rendition of the traditional brokerage service or
for the performance of similar services and other distributional functions in
effecting delivery to warehouse receivers specified by the shipper. There would
be nothing to prevent any independent intermediary from qualifying for the
discount by tailoring his practices to the specifications. Any discriminations
resulting from the program would not constitute an abuse of the brokerage
function, even in the unlikely event that some intermediaries were financially
unable to provide the investment necessary to furnish the prescribed facilities,
since the increased costs to those who did would produce an economic parity.
67 Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694, 703-04 '(9th Cir. 1964). One writer has
commented that:
Discrimination in prices under Section 2 (a) means more than difference in prices
only in the respect that unequal price treatment implies lack of availability of the lower
price to purchasers paying the higher price. A schedule of quantity discounts offered
to all customers, the highest bracket of which is within the purchasing range of the
average small purchaser, is not discriminatory even though some purchasers may buy
only in the lower quantity brackets, since in such a case there is no inequality of
treatment.
AUsTIN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 21.
68 See the myopic view of functional discounts set forth in § 74.1 (a) (5), note 3, of the
Trade Practice Rules. 30 Fed. Reg. 5331-32 (1965). Compare ATr'y GEN. NAT'L COMM.
ANTITRUST REP. 207 (1955).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
To be consistent with the act's purpose of preventing subterfuge in the awarding
of unjustified preferential treatment, the additional services called for must
be of substantial value to the seller, and the announced policy must be con-
sistently followed. It is not, however, intended that the word "value" would
contemplate proof identical to that which would be required to establish the cost
defense of 2(a). Fortunately, the Commission has had recent experience under
that principal subsection with warehousing and redistribution discounts69 and
could, where it has reason to believe that economies are not fully justified, enter-
tain an action under that provision. The very proliferation of such cases under
2 (a) indicates its appropriate statutory context.70
Thus, the proposed rationale would comport with the act's overall purpose
of preventing unwarranted injury at the buyer level, while allowing room for
competitive adjustment to new efficiencies in distribution.7 In the words of
Commissioner Elman:
Who, in this case, are the favored, and who the unfavored, buyers? Who
is, or could be, injured by the . . . method of doing business? Where is
there any threat to competition, or danger of monopoly? . . . To hold
this system unlawful would impede, not advance, the policies of the Robin-
son-Patman Act.1
2
Response to Commissioner Elman's question evokes reanalysis of the prac-
tices which 2(c) seeks to reach. No "dummy brokerage" operation controlled
by a large wholesale distributor, chain, cooperative or voluntary group would
qualify for the discount since no services in redistribution would be performed.
The proposal seeks to recognize the services of the independent distributor who
serves as a middleman between shipper and such purchasers rather than those
who redistribute merchandise to retail stores. Consequently, brokerage allow-
ances made directly to the latter class of customers to whom no distributional
services are rendered - the second practice covered by the act - would likewise
be prohibited. It follows that the third type of practice - preferential treat-
ment similar to that involved in the Broch case accorded one not shown to have
qualified therefor through the joint action of the seller and his broker - would
obtain no sanction under the suggestion.
V. Conclusion - Reanalysis and Precedent
One of the factors most recommending the adoption of the proposed test
69 E.g., Mueller Co. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1963).
70 Cf. General Auto Supplies, Inc. v. FTC, 346 F.2d 311, 317 (7th Cir. 1965); Monroe
Auto Equip. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1965).
71 One may ask why a test taking into account services other than brokerage services would
be relevant under the brokerage section at all. See Trade Practice Rules § 74.2(f), Example
No. 3, 30 Fed. Reg. 5333 (1965). Cognizance under this provision is necessary because the
allowance is frankly for brokerage, but for brokerage plus other services and facilities. Hence,
whereas the allowance is for services rendered, a pro tanto resurrection of the "for services
rendered" clause as once urged is not called for, since other services would be necessary to
qualify.
72 Flotill Prods., Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 16970, at 22048 '(F.T.C. June 26, 1964).
Commissioner Elman was discussing the field broker aspect of the Flotill case, wherein the inter-
mediaries did not take possession of the merchandise involved. Nevertheless, the same questions
pertain to the instant proposal.
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is that it is in a logical sequence of judicial interpretations of 2(c), including
Broch, and that it preserves the per se status of the subsection. Early decisions
under the act have been misinterpreted as standing for the proposition that once
the passage of brokerage between seller (or his agent) and buyer (or his agent)
has been established, there is an end to the matter, without regard for dis-
crimination or competitive consequences.
In the oft-cited A & P case, however, both the Commission and the court
concluded that the practice effected competitive injury and the court appraised
2(c) as dealing "in particular with a trade practice which has frequently re-
sulted in price discriminations and unfair competition.""3 In both the Oliverr'
and Biddle 5 cases, the appellate courts centered on concessions and discrimina-
tions which conveyed unmerited advantages to certain purchasers. And in Herzog,
the Second Circuit found that the challenged practice "... . result[ed] in a price
discrimination in favor of the retailers who do business with the respondents, and
contrary to the purpose and language of the statute. . . ."" The case which
made a clear determination that discrimination is not an element of the statute
was Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC." In view of the congressional intent, the
analysis thereof in other early decisions and, more important, the recent evalua-
tions of the act, reassessment and rejection of the broad rule proposed in South-
gate is overdue.
It is noteworthy also that the approach recommended herein does not effect
a marriage of the provisions of 2(a) with those of 2(c). A respondent under
the latter subsection will still not be permitted to raise the cost justification or
meeting competition defenses, nor will the Commission be compelled to prove
competitive injury as in a 2 (a) proceeding."8
It is possible to reject the proposed solution for a new clarification of 2(c),
or any other proposals which stress a flexible approach, on the basis that 2(c)
is an absolute provision. The subsection would thereby be relegated to an era
when cases were determined by incantation of the talismanic litany of per se.
Conceivably, the argument could be made that brokerage abuses had been so
flagrant prior to adoption of the Robinson-Patman Act that the only remedy
available to Congress was a structural rigidification of the brokerage function in
order to limit market power arbitrarily. The short answer to such a contention
is that the Robinson-Patman Act is aimed not at curbing the conditions of market,
but its abuse, not at structure but at behavior. As stated in the House Com-
mittee report:
In conclusion, your committee wishes to correct some important mis-
apprehensions, and even misrepresentations, that have been broadly urged
73 Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667, 677 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308
U.S. 625 (1940).
74 Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763, 771 (4th Cir. 1939).
75 Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687, 692 (2d Cir. 1938).
76 FTC v. Herzog, 150 F.2d 450, 452 (2d Cir. 1945).
77 Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1945).
78 The author prefers a statutory framework in which competitive injury and the cost
defense would be standards in any matter involving a direct or indirect (brokerage) price dis-
crimination. Nevertheless, in light of the wash of history he agrees with the report of the
Attorney General's Committee that legislative redress is necessary.
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with regard to the probable effect of this bill. There is nothing in it to
penalize, shackle, or discourage efficiency, or to reward inefficiency. There
is nothing in it to fix prices, or enable the fixation of prices; nor to limit the
freedom of price movements in response to changing market conditions.
Any physical economies that are to be found in mass buying and dis-
tribution, whether by corporate chain, voluntary chain, mail-order house,
department store, or by the cooperative grouping of producers, wholesalers,
retailers, or distributors - and whether those economies are from more
orderly processes of manufacture, or from the elimination of unnecessary
salesmen, unnecessary travel expense, unnecessary warehousing, unneces-
sary truck or forms of delivery, or other such causes - none of them are
in the remotest degree disturbed by this bill. Nor does it in any way infringe
the seller's freedom to give a part or all of the benefit of the saving so
effected to others with whom he deals, whether in higher prices paid to the
producer from whom he buys his raw materials,, or in higher wages to those
who labor in prdduction or handling of his goods, or in lower prices to the
customer, including the ultimate consumer who buys them.79
It is high time that 2(c) be clearly and explicitly identified with its legisla-
tive foundations and with broader antitrust goals;"0 other statutes are available
to proceed against supposed structural affronts to a competitive economy.
79 H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1936).
80 Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
